The original observation by Phillips simply noted an empirical regularity: unemployment and inflation tended to be inversely related. This observation came at a time when Keynesian macroeconomic theory had a very simple and incomplete model of inflation. Keynesian theory treated wages as, if not fixed, then on an exogenously given time path. It was a theory of how nominal aggregate spending determined the level of output and employment, so long as supply-side limits on output and employment were not encountered. It was recognized that when aggregate demand exceeded supply-side limits, the result would be inflation, but the standard Keynesian theory had a discontinuity at the point where output hit "capacity", and it had no quantitative predictions about the determination of the level of inflation once capacity limits were hit.
As macroeconomists began to think about quantitative modeling of the aggregate economy, the Phillips curve offered a way to make Keynesian inflation theory continuous and quantitative. The level of unemployment could be used to measure how far the economy was from capacity, and thereby to make quantitative predictions about how inflation would be affected by the level of aggregate demand. Policy, whether monetary or fiscal, was conceived as affecting inflation via a causal chain, from aggregate demand, to the level of output and employment (and thereby un- the coefficient values uncertain. Nonetheless, the fact that Primiceri's interpretation of history works as well as it does may explain why this way of thinking still has a hold on policy-makers' thinking.
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This is interesting, because we know that Lucas and Rapping in a series of papers in the late 60's and early 70's (1973; 1969b; 1969a) developed a model with some plausibility in which Phillips's empirical regularity could be misleading if used, as the Keynesian models were doing, to analyze the effects of policy. This new simple model arrived on the scene just as the US entered a period in the 1970's of simultaneous high unemployment and high inflation, making the data in unemploymentinflation plots jump off the historical Phillips curve. The simple rational expectations version of this theory, in which the causal direction is reversed, with inflation surprises causing changes in unemployment, did not fit the data any better than the deteriorating standard Phillips curve, but it provided a qualitative story about why a Phillips curve might first appear in the data, then disappear in the presence of Keynesian policy-making.
While a few of the early advocates of rational expectations modeling (Sargent reference) held out the hope that it would generate "cross-equation restrictions" that would lead to improved quantitative policy models, the new theory was more commonly interpreted as implying the entire enterprise of large-scale policy modeling was quixotic. Simultaneous equation econometrics began to disappear from economics PhD training in the US, while every new PhD could explain how the "Lucas critique" implied that Keynesian macro models would lead to policy errors. With the simple "Lucas supply curve" (the rational expectations, reversed-direction, Phillips curve) replacing the Phillips curve, there was furthermore no need for big policy INFLATION EXPECTATIONS, UNCERTAINTY, THE PHILLIPS CURVE, AND MONETARY POLICY 4 models. The best monetary policy could do was to avoid creating surprises. Milton Friedman's proposal of a fixed growth rate for the money atock (which he supported with a different set of arguments) fit well with the rational expectations policy analysis.
Meanwhile, those actually making monetary policy faced a continuing need to make decisions responsibly in the light of data emerging week by week. The Thatcher government's experiment in the UK with a simple monetary growth rate policy rule showed that the historical statistical relationships among various measures of the money stock, and between the money stock and inflation and output, could deteriorate when exploited for policy purposes in the same way, and for the same reasons, that the empirical Phillips curve had decayed. With academic economic research turned almost entirely away from large scale policy modeling, central bank economists developed their own solutions. They emerged with models that preserved many of the characteristics of the first generation of Keynesian models: equationby-equation specification; emphasis on flow equilibrium; and Phillips curves as the locus for non-neutrality of monetary policy. Expectations now entered the models more pervasively, and the models, to sidestep the Lucas critique, made it at least formally possible to treat expectations as rational. The discipline of simultaneous equations econometric inference was entirely abandoned. For policy modeling, the simple Lucas supply curve was inadequate. Besides not fitting the data, its microeconomic underpinnings were either informal or, in formal models, highly abstract and unrealistic -for example models of "island economies" in which people had to infer the value of the economy-wide interest rate or money stock from the price level on their own island. The policy models began by simply adding an inflation expectations term to the right-hand-side of the original Phillips This theory sidesteps the Lucas critique, because it contains expectations explicitly and assumes that expectations are rational. But the Lucas critique is only one special case of a generic problem we face in econometric modeling: we make simplifications and approximations that we realize are contingent, so that some kinds of changes in policy, or in the nature of exogenous disturbances, will force us to change the model. The NK Phillips curve is clearly unstable under some kinds of policy change -indeed under exactly the same kinds of policy change that the Lucas critique claimed could undermine old Keynesian models. Though the agents in the NK model have rational expectations and no money illusion, the theory has simply moved the nonneutrality from agent behavior itself into the constraints the agent faces, the frictions. 
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The NK theory gives a central role not to unemployment, but to the output gap.
Recently the empirical literature (Sbordone, 2003) , e.g., has recognized that the output gap is actually important in the theory because it measures marginal cost, and has moved toward more direct measures of this, in particular to looking at the labor share of output. 2 The model was identified by assuming the pattern of zero restrictions shown in Table 1 for the matrix of contemporaneous coefficients in a model of the form The first equation, labeled "policy" in the table, represents monetary policy behavior. The zero restrictions in that row reflect the fact that gdp data are not available 3 The model was estimated using a dummy observation "Minnesota prior", shrinking toward an independent random walks prior mean. The R programs used to estimate the model are available via the subversion internet protocol at svn://sims.princeton.edu/R.
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to policy-makers within the quarter. 4 The zero restrictions in the first and last column reflect an assumption that private-sector variables not set in auction markets The most prominent difference between the two periods is that in the later period a monetary policy shock forecasts a hump-backed time path of further increases in the funds rate, followed by a later decline. In the earlier period the model estimates less of this interest-rate-smoothing behavior.
In both periods, the labor share variable moves very little in response to a monetary policy shock. In the earlier period, it moves up somewhat in response to a monetary contraction, though not by a lot relative to its overall standard deviation. marginal costs, and hence, via the NK Phillips curve mechanism, a tendency for price decreases to lag behind wage decreases.
We can also consider the second question -how important is the NK Phillips curve as a way to understand determinants of inflation other than policy disturbances. For this we can look at the responses of the price level to all seven sources of disturbance in the system, as in Figures 3 and 4 . Since labor share, in logs, is wage minus output per hour minus price, the effects of a surprise change in labor share are the corresponding linear combination of lines on the graph -aqua minus purple minus blue. In the pre-79:3 graph, this nets out to close to zero. In the post-83 graph, there is a strong effect of productivity surprises, with high productivity leading to increased inflation. This is not due to any complicated behavior of productivity in response to its own shocks. Productivity shocks are the main source of variation in labor share, and they produce sustained, single-signed movements in labor share.
What produces this pattern is not clear from this partially identified model; but it is clear that the unidirectional NK Phillips curve causal chain is not at work here, as declining costs are associated with increasing inflation.
My conclusion is that the data show a perhaps surprisingly stable pattern of influence on prices, wages and output. Monetary policy is not neutral. But thinking about this pattern in terms of the NK Phillips curve does not appear to be helpful. rational agents, these impacts involve invoking transversality conditions. I have a colleague who interrupts every discussion of this kind of model with "Is this going to involve transversality conditions?". His view is that few if any economists really understand transversality conditions (which is also my view) and that it is therefore unreasonable to entertain models that invoke transversality conditions to explain the behavior of actual human beings.
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Pre−79:3 Responses of p
But transversality conditions apply even to less-than-hyperrational agents. They are really just a name for wealth effects. If monetary policy raises the rate of return on government bonds, and if agents project that this rise in the relative return of government paper will be persistent, government paper becomes more attractive, people will tend to trade other assets for government paper, and there will therfore be downward pressure on the rate at which government paper trades for other goods -i.e. the price level. But there are conditions under which a rise in interest rates on government bonds, generated by the central bank, will not lead bond-holders to believe in persistently higher returns on government bonds. Higher real returns are possible, in general equilibrium, only if increased primary surpluses emerge in response to the higher interest rates. In an economy in which political economy or bureaucratic inefficiency makes increased primary surpluses impossible, the higher interest rates will only generate an increased rate of issue of government paper, with no increased rate of return -indeed with capital losses for holders of long nominal debt. It may take some time for bondholders to appreciate the nature of these fiscal
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dynamics, so that the inflationary effects of increased interest rates do not take hold immediately. But this only makes the real value of the outstanding debt at current prices increase more rapidly, so that when the realization that the increased debt has no real backing sinks in, the eventual effects on demand are even larger. This kind of situation is widely acknowledged to have existed in some countries and some time periods, especially where interest expense has become a large fraction of the total government debt and nominal interest rates are high.
Most macroeconomists, though, think of this type of scenario as applying perhaps to Brazil in some periods, but not to the US, ever. My view is that we should reevaluate this possibility. Our recent history of a stock market boom, a housing price boom, then a commodity price boom and a decline in the value of the dollar, may be best understood as reflecting the evolution of thinking by bondholders about current and future US monetary and fiscal policy. In the 1970's when the US had its great burst of inflation, fiscal policy was by some measures much more unstable than monetary policy. On average over time any country that can issue debt must be running primary surpluses -the conventional surplus plus interest payments. Here, though, I want to discuss two lines of thinking that I find particularly interesting and promising. One is rational inattention theory. This is a theory of why people do not use all of the information that lies in front of them "for free". It invokes
Shannon's notion of a "channel" with finite "capacity" to process information, and assumes that people are such finite-capacity channels. This implies that there are limits on how quickly and precisely their behavior can react to information about a stochastically evolving economic environment. The attractive feature of Shannon's theory for engineers is that it allows discussion of information flows and the capacity of information channels in a way that is quantitatively precise, yet abstracts from the physical characteristics of the channel and of the information. These days we are all familiar with the notion that our internet connections can be characterized is no reason why rational optimizing agents need share the same probability disribution. When optimizing agents with different probability distributions interact in markets, they will be attracted to betting with each other, if not explicitly, then by borrowing, lending, and making speculative investments. Furthermore, if optimistic investors, having borrowed from pessimists, discover they were mistaken, there will be a rapid adjustment in asset prices, shifts in wealth between agents, and a high volume of transactions -all phenomena we see, and are concerned about, in actual asset markets.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY
So what are the implications of these new strands of research for the Phillips curve, monetary policy, and macroeconomics more generally. I do not have space to consider all the implications here, but some interrelated implications are worth drawing out.
Rational inattention implies that people will behave as if they are observing market signals with error, and that agents with a bigger stake will invest more of their capacity in precise observation of a given signal. It therefore provides one rationale for why economic agents might have different probability distributions over the state of the economy, and for why the differences might persist despite the accumulation of "freely observable" evidence. Rational inattention and differences of opinion both may be related to why it is so hard, and yet so important, to model the interaction of asset markets with monetary policy and with the economy. Hard as it may be to model how a set of "communist" rational agents would have modeled the future of fiscal policy in the 70's and 80's, it is harder still to imagine that every agent, whether he held bonds or not, whether she was 75 years old or 23, whether she was thinking of taking out a mortgage to buy a first home or had lived in the same house for 40 years and paid off her mortgage, had the same views about the future of fiscal policy and, therefore, the values of nominally denominated assets.
Differences of views, learning, and rational inattention might explain why the interaction of monetary policy and fiscal policy with asset markets seems sometimes to work itself out on a long time scale. Not everyone will make the same assessment, at the same time, of the implications of transversality conditions. It may be that this can lead to wide swings in asset markets, and to delayed and unpredictable effects of monetary policy shifts.
We can't model every person's beliefs individually, and working formally with rational inattention theory at least at this point seems hard 6 . Nonetheless it seems important, especially in the light of the recent history of asset markets and their interaction with monetary policy, to get some working approximation of the effects of rational inattention and differences of beliefs into our models.
Where does this leave the Phillips curve? Something like the Phillips curve will continue to have a place in a general equilibrium model, as part of characterizing the 6 Working formally with rational expectations theory also appeared hard at one point, though, so this may change.
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interaction of costs, prices wages and output. But the rational inattention perspective suggests that locating stickiness and inertia in that one equation may be a mistake.
The same limits on information processing may be at work in the slow adaptation of prices and wages to each other that are at work in sluggish reactions of consumption to income, or of investment to interest rates. Recognizing that sluggishness of various kinds may be related, through dependence on a common resource constraint, and that sluggishness represents conservation of a valuable resource, may lead to new modeling insights and to new ways of assessing the welfare implications of price stability and instability.
As with many important theories, the long run value of Phillips curve theories may lie in the new flames that are emerging from their dying embers.
[Note: In some sections of this version of the paper I discuss ideas drawn from work that I have not yet properly referenced.]
